The authors write about US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and how NATOÕs new Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, places less importance on these weapons. Though the current Europe-based arsenal is only a fraction of what it was at its peak in 1971, 150"200 bombs are currently deployed in Europe and stored at six bases in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The authors present information on the weapons at each of these arsenals.
T he new Strategic Concept, adopted by NATO at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, reaffirmed the continued importance of nuclear weapons to the security of the alliance. The document, which is intended to establish consensus on NATO missions and methods in light of new security challenges, did not, however, include a decision on the fate of the roughly 150"200 B61 tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons that the US Air Force deploys in Europe for the purposes of extended deterrence. Instead, the NATO countries decided to tie the fate of the deployment to reductions in the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States unilaterally reduced its inventory of B61 bombs deployed in Europe by more than half. The current level represents a tiny fraction of the 1971 peak of 7,300 US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Since then (with the exception of a period in the mid-1980s), the Europe-based arsenal has been shrinking. The most dramatic reductions occurred in 1986"87, when the United States withdrew nearly 2,000 weapons from European soil, and in 1991"93, when it removed more than 3,000 weapons (see Figure 1) . A December 2008 Defense Department report on the US nuclear mission stated that the number of US nuclear weapons in Europe has been reduced Òby more than 97 percent since their peak in the 1970sÓ (Defense Department, 2008: 59) . Guy Roberts, NATOÕs deputy assistant secretarygeneral for weapons of mass destruction policy, said in June 2010: ÒWe only have a few hundred nuclear weapons, B61 gravity bombs, US nuclear weapons, in Europe todayÓ (NATO Review, 2010) .
The 150"200 bombs now deployed in Europe are stored at six bases in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey (see Table 1 ). The US Air Force keeps approximately 100 of the bombs at two bases: Aviano Air Base (AB) in Italy and Incirlik AB in Turkey. The remaining 50"100 weapons are stored across four national bases: Bu ¬chel AB in Germany, Ghedi Torre AB in Italy, Kleine Brogel AB in Belgium, and Volkel AB in the Netherlands.
Although the nuclear weapons are deployed at specific bases in specific countries, it is important not to think of the European deployment as fixed; a potential nuclear strike originating from a particular base would not 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 Year Warheads Figure 1 . US nuclear weapons in Europe. The stockpile at Incirlik AB includes an estimated 10"20 weapons earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16 aircraft. Although former Turkish officials say the F-16s have never had a nuclear role, the Pentagon says they currently do. Nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Turkey's Akinci AB and Balikesir AB in 1995, and some of the weapons were transferred to Incirlik. In 2001, 40 of 90 weapons at Incirlik AB were "host" weapons for the 4th and 9th Wings. Since then, one of the wings is believed to have lost its nuclear mission, and the inventory reduced accordingly. Turkey has rejected a US request to deploy a fighter wing at Incirlik, making the weapons deployment at the base unique. The 87 WS3 WSVs each can store up to four bombs for a total maximum of 348 weapons. Normally only one or two weapons are present. Vaults at some other bases that used to store nuclear bombs might still be maintained in a caretaker status for potential dispersal contingencies. 3 Belgium has not yet decided how to replace its F-16 jet fighters, which are expected to reach the end of their service life around 2020.
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A series of intrusions at Kleine Brogel by unauthorized personnel in recent years has raised serious questions about security there and how the weapons are stored at the base. In the latest known incident, in late January 2010, activists from the peace group Vredesactie (ÒPeace ActionÓ) organized a ÒBombspottingÓ campaign in which they climbed the fences and were able to walk freely to inspect 15 of the 26 aircraft shelters before eventually being arrested by authorities. The activists believe they were able to identify 8 of the 11 shelters equipped with nuclear weapons storage vaults in two main areas of the base (Bombspotting, 2010) . A similar intrusion occurred in November 2009. A Belgian defense official insisted that the activists Ònever, ever got anywhere near a sensitive area,Ó and that it would be Òanother cup of teaÓ if they approached Òsensitive areasÓ (Dougherty, 2010) .
If the official is correct, then the absence of immediate security force intervention would suggest that the 11 shelters the activists missed include the three vaults holding nuclear weapons. Three vaults could potentially store 12 weapons, but it is hard to believe that the activists happened to miss exactly the three vaults with weapons. Possible explanations that could account for the apparently lax security include a permissive security culture at the base, overconfidence in the intrinsic security provided by the underground vaults, a decision to ignore the activists in order not to reveal the actual location of weapons, or that Kleine Brogel no longer stores nuclear weapons. The continued presence of the 701st MUNSS suggests that weapons are still stored there; however, the slow response by security forces does not bestow confidence in the security of US nuclear weapons in Europe.
Germany is host to 10"20 B61 bombs at its Bu ¬chel AB, for delivery by German PA-200 Tornados of the 33rd Fighter Bomber Squadron; the weapons are under custody of the US Air Force Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67 (1) 702nd MUNSS. As at Kleine Brogel, 11 shelters at Bu ¬chel are equipped with underground vaults for the bombs, with a maximum capacity of 44 weapons. The German government has decided to retain the Tornado aircraft through 2020. Although it is not clear if this includes the aircraft at Bu ¬chel AB, the Ministry of Defense rebutted a report in the Rheinische Post in October 2010 that all Tornados would be retired by 2013, saying the aircraft would be maintained through 2020 and that a final retirement date has not been decided (German Ministry of Defense, 2010). GermanyÕs next-generation strike aircraft, the Eurofighter, is not equipped to carry nuclear weapons, and Berlin is not believed to have plans to acquire replacement aircraft for the nuclear mission.
Italy hosts an estimated 60"70 B61 bombs at two locations. Approximately 50 of the weapons are thought to be stored at Aviano AB, for delivery by F-16C/Ds of the US Air Force 31st Fighter Wing. The base has 18 underground vaults for nuclear weapons storage (for a maximum capacity of 72 bombs).
Another 10"20 B61s are believed to be stored at Ghedi Torre AB, for delivery by Italian PA-200 Tornado aircraft of the 6th Fighter Wing; the weapons at Ghedi Torre AB are under custody of the US Air Force 704th MUNSS. A decade ago, the base stored 40 bombs, but it is likely that the inventory has been reduced to match the deployment at other national bases.
The Italian Tornado is expected to begin retiring sometime after 2015, to be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a US aircraft intended to provide an affordable option to the US and allied armed forces. Italy is tentatively scheduled to receive its first (Wall, 2010) . The Netherlands originally ordered 85 F-35s, but a final procurement decision has now been delayed until after the general election in 2014, with the number of aircraft reduced to fewer than 85.
Turkey hosts an estimated 60"70 B61 bombs at Incirlik AB, down from the 2001 level of 90 weapons; however, the posture is unique in NATO. Most of the bombs (approximately 50) are for delivery by US aircraft, but the US Air Force does not have a fighter wing based at Incirlik. Requests to deploy a wing there have been turned down by Turkey, so the NATO nuclear posture at Incirlik is more of a half-posture. In a crisis, US aircraft from other bases would have to first deploy to Incirlik to pick up the weapons before they could be used.
The remaining 10"20 bombs at Incirlik AB are earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16A/Bs. Until 1995, Akinci AB in central Turkey and Balikesir AB in western Turkey also stored US nuclear weapons for delivery by the 4th Wing and 9th Wing, respectively, but after the US MUNSS at each base was withdrawn, the bombs (about 40 weapons) were moved to Incirlik. Since then, the number of ÒTurkishÓ bombs at Incirlik AB has probably been reduced to 10"20 weapons to correspond to the inventories at other national bases, and one of the two wings lost its nuclear mission.
TurkeyÕs F-16s are slated to be replaced by JSFs beginning in 2015, when the first six aircraft are scheduled to be delivered. The Turkish Air Force is scheduled to receive a total of 100 JSFs through 2025 (Defense Department, 2010b) .
There are conflicting reports about the status of the Turkish nuclear mission. Gen. Ergin Celasin, former commander (until 2001) of the Turkish Air Force, is on record stating that TurkeyÕs role in the NATO nuclear strike mission ended in the 1990s with the withdrawal of weapons from the national Turkish bases (Kibaroglu, 2010) . In contrast, according to Pentagon sources, Turkey currently uses its F-16s to execute the nuclear mission. Moreover, until Turkey acquires a sufficient number of nuclear-capable JSFs over the 15 years, its F-16s are scheduled to receive a Òstop-gapÓ upgrade to make them capable of carrying the new B61-12 bomb that will replace the B61-3/4 beginning in 2017.
The confusion about TurkeyÕs status may have to do with the aircraftÕs degree of nuclear readiness, which has changed over time, ranging from full alert in the 1980s, to withdrawal from national bases in the 1990s, to todayÕs Òpick up the weapons at Incirlik if neededÓ posture. During these phases, the aircraft status changed from nuclear-capable, certified, and loaded, to nuclear-capable and certified, to nuclear-capable. Today, the Turkish aircraft are nuclear-capable (according to US sources) but neither loaded nor certified. This, combined with the absence of a US wing at Incirlik AB, underscores the special status of the Turkish posture.
US tactical nuclear forces: Changes and modernization
The United States also has made significant changes to its tactical nuclear forces over the last decade. In addition to withdrawing nuclear bombs from Ramstein AB and Lakenheath AB, the US Air Force has reduced its tactical fighter wing capacity in the United States. During the late 1990s and the first part of the George W. Bush administration, the Air Force maintained two tactical fighter wings in the United States as a backup to nuclear contingencies in NATO, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia: the 4th Fighter In addition, the Obama administration announced its decision in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to retire the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack sealaunched cruise missile (TLAM/N). Approximately 320 TLAM/Ns have been in storage since they were offloaded from the US fleet in 1992. Surface ships lost the capability to carry and launch the weapon in 1994, but the missiles were retained for potential redeployment on a limited number of attack submarines. Approximately half of the TLAM/Ns were earmarked for NATO support, but the 2010 NPR stated that the weapon was redundant and that other nuclear capabilities could adequately provide for the nuclear portion of the extended deterrence mission in support of NATO.
The NPR announced the US decision to equip a portion of the F-35 JSF aircraft (Block IV) with a nuclear capability to eventually replace F-15E and F-16 aircraft starting in 2017"18. As mentioned above, three states with a NATO nuclear strike missionÑItaly, the Netherlands, and TurkeyÑare planning to acquire JSF aircraft over the next 15 years. The United States will begin funding the JSF Block IV in 2011"12; the nuclear capability is expected to cost several hundred million dollars.
Because the JSF is equipped with computer software that is incompatible with the B61-3/4 bombs currently deployed in Europe (and to extend the B61 service life), the Pentagon is planning to build a new version of the B61 bomb: the B61-12. The NPR concluded that the United States should proceed with Òfull scope life extension of the B61Ó (Defense Department, 2010c: xiii) . The B61-12 will be based on the B61-4 design but will also incorporate features from the B61-3, B61-7, and B61-10 bombs. The B61-12 will have new safety and security features in addition to those that are already installed on the B61 family, some of the safest nuclear weapons in the US stockpile.
The production of a nuclear-capable JSF and a B61-12 bomb, according to the NPR, Òensure[s] that the United States will retain the capability to forwarddeploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance commitmentsÓ (Defense Department, 2010c: 27) if necessary.
The political context
NATOÕs new Strategic Concept leaves the door open for the full removal of the remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Several NATO member countries have called for a review of NATO nuclear weapons policy; Germany has explicitly called for withdrawal, and the overwhelming majority of NATO countries have supported UN resolutions calling for a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.
It is noteworthy that several major recent policy reviewsÑthe Quadrennial Defense Review, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the report of the Group of Experts led by Madeleine AlbrightÑdid not explicitly call for the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. All emphasized the importance of providing extended deterrence to the allies, but this does not necessarily require nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.
Even the decision in the 2010 NPR to proceed with production of a nuclear-capable JSF and a new B61 bomb leaves room for the possibility of Department, 2010c: 27"28) . The Obama administration envisions Ònew, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent. These regional architectures and new capabilities . . . make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategyÓ (Defense Department, 2010a: 14) .
Compared to NATOÕs 1999 document, the new Strategic Concept is significantly different in that it places less importance on US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Gone is the previous message that these weapons provide an essential military and political link between Europe and North America. Instead, the new Strategic Concept states that it is the strategic forces of the United States, in particularÑand to some extent Britain and FranceÑthat provide the Òsupreme guarantee of the security of the AllianceÓ (NATO, 2010) .
The new document commits to some form of US nuclear presence in Europe by designating Òthe broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangementsÓ (NATO, 2010; emphasis added) . But the new language is much more vague than that found in the 1999 document, and could simply be met by the alliesÕ participation in Nuclear Planning Group meetings, deployment of some US dual-capable aircraft in Europe (without weapons), and the alliesÕ continued involvement in the SNOWCAT program.
Unfortunately, the new Strategic Concept makes further reductions in US nuclear weapons in Europe conditional on Russian reciprocity. ÒIn any further reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of shortrange nuclear weaponsÓ (NATO, 2010) .
While there are many good reasons for wanting reductions to the Russian tactical arsenal and increased transparency, NATO has in factÑon several occasions since the end of the Cold WarÑbeen willing to unilaterally reduce the number of US weapons in Europe without making it conditional upon Russian reciprocity. NATO has done so while arguing that its weapons were not directed against Russia. Arguing now that a US withdrawal from Europe is suddenly dependent on Russian reductions after all seems to turn back the clock to a time when the Soviet Union was the enemy and NATO looked to the east when sizing its nuclear posture in Europe.
Just how the language in the new Strategic Concept will affect the US nuclear posture in Europe will depend on the result of a Òdeterrence reviewÓ that NATO plans to undertake in 2011.
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was referring to the warhead number in the nuclear weapons deployment authorization for Europe, that document allows for variations of þ/À 10 percent in the number of weapons deployed. 3. The Protective Aircraft Shelters are sometimes also referred to as Hardened Aircraft Shelters.
